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Security

eduroam is a security-sensitive service and should be operated as critical infrastructure.

Security Principles

  • use WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-Enterprise only
  • do not deploy captive portals on the eduroam SSID
  • validate RADIUS server certificates on all client devices
  • keep authentication, proxying, and logging systems patched and monitored
  • restrict administrative access to trusted networks and operators

Certificate Management

The RADIUS server certificate is central to EAP security. Institutions should:

  • use a publicly trusted server certificate or a private CA distributed through managed profiles
  • include the full certificate chain
  • use a certificate whose subject/SAN matches the name configured in client profiles
  • track expiry and renew well before the renewal deadline
  • protect private keys with strict filesystem permissions

Recommended practice:

  • separate server certificates from any internal CA private key
  • automate renewal where possible
  • test renewed certificates with eduroam CAT profiles before production rollout

Shared Secret Management

  • use long, random shared secrets (minimum 32 characters) between RADIUS peers
  • rotate shared secrets annually or after any suspected compromise
  • never reuse the same shared secret for NRO connections and local AP connections
  • store secrets in a password manager or secrets management system, never in plain text
  • regularly audit clients.conf and remove stale AP client entries

RADIUS Hardening

  • allow RADIUS traffic only from known APs, controllers, and federation peers
  • use strong shared secrets generated per client or peer
  • disable unused virtual servers and modules
  • disable unused EAP types such as MD5 and GTC with plaintext password
  • set TLS minimum version: tls_min_version = '1.2'
  • use a strong cipher list: HIGH:!aNULL:!MD5:!RC4:!3DES
  • run FreeRADIUS as the packaged service account (freerad by default)
  • restrict radiusd.conf to listen only on necessary interfaces
  • use firewall rules to restrict RADIUS ports (UDP 1812/1813) to known peers only
  • restrict shell access and use MFA for administrators where possible

Network Controls

  • permit UDP 1812 for authentication and UDP 1813 for accounting as required
  • limit management access with firewalls or ACLs
  • separate management, server, and client traffic
  • send eduroam users to controlled user VLANs or roles, not infrastructure networks

Rogue AP and MITM Risks

  • rogue APs broadcasting the eduroam SSID can harvest credentials when clients do not validate server certificates
  • misconfigured clients that accept any certificate are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
  • always deploy eduroam CAT profiles with certificate pinning to protect users on unmanaged devices
  • monitor for unusual authentication patterns such as brute-force attempts or credential stuffing
  • enforce TLS 1.2 as the minimum; disable weak cipher suites

RADIUS Accounting and Logging

Logging is mandatory under federation policy and essential for abuse investigation. Required log fields:

Log field Purpose
User-Name Track which realm authenticated; required for abuse response
Calling-Station-Id MAC address of the connecting device; device tracking
Called-Station-Id AP MAC/SSID; locate where the user connected
Acct-Session-Time Session duration; billing and capacity planning
Framed-IP-Address IP assigned; required for law enforcement requests
Timestamp Auth time; correlate with other logs

Data Protection and Logging

  • log enough for incident response, abuse handling, and troubleshooting
  • avoid exposing unnecessary personal data in exported logs
  • protect SQL and log storage with backup and retention controls
  • define retention periods in line with institutional and regulatory requirements

High Availability

Security includes resilience. Production deployments should have:

  • at least two RADIUS servers where possible
  • redundant uplinks and power
  • health monitoring for authentication and accounting
  • documented failover and certificate-recovery procedures